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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MULLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Plaintiff/Appellee,
-vs-

Appellate Case No. 20040208 - CA

DAVID G. ALLEN and SUSAN S.,
ALLEN.

District Court Case No. 020910005

Defendants/Appellants.

DEFEND ANTS/ APPELLANTS (hereinafter "Defendants" or "Aliens") submit the
following as their opening brief in the above matter:
JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
Jurisdiction to review the final judgment and order herein, which is the Judgment on
Special Verdict ("Verdict") in the trial court, dated February 27, 2004, is vested in the Utah Court
of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated. §78-2a-3.
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
The matter below is a civil proceeding seeking a judgment for money damages and the
order appealed from is the Verdict in the trial court.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented on appeal in this matter:
1.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the motion of the Defendant, David G.

Allen, for summary judgment based upon theories of res judicata and collateral estoppel arising
out of the divorce proceeding between those parties9 Did the trial court lack subject matter
jurisdiction?
2.

Did the trial court err in refusing to grant the motion of the Defendant, David G.

Allen, for summary judgment or to dismiss at the close of the Plaintiffs case, upon a theory that
the Defendant, David G. Allen, could not commit a trespass upon property titled in his name, as
a matter of law? Could Defendant Susan Allen trespass on her son's property if her conduct
with regard to that property was with his permission?
3.

Did the trial court improperly instruct the jury as to the law regarding trespass?

4.

Is the jury's verdict so unsupported by the evidence that it cannot stand as a

matter of law? Is this especially true of the punitive damages awarded? Are the punitive
damages constitutional?
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS, CASES, STATUTES AND RULES
The following may be dispositive: Utah Code Annotated § 78-18-1, The Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Utah Code Annotated § 30-3-5.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
As to the first, second and third issues presented for rex iew. the Court should review this
matter de novo for correctness. A trial court's conclusions of law in ci\ il cases are reviewed for
correctness, and these matters concern the trial court's conclusions of law. United Park Citv Mines
Co v. Greater Park Citv Co., 870 P.2d 880. 885 (Utah 1993); Society of Separationists. Inc. v.
Taggart, 862 P.2d 1339, 1341 (Utah 1993).
As to the fourth issue presented for review, whether the jury's verdict is supported by the
evidence, this Court owes broad deference to the fact finder, and its power to review a jury verdict
challenged on the grounds of insufficient evidence is limited. In reviewing this challenge to a civil
jury verdict, the appellate court must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Crookston v: Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991); Von Hake v. Thomas, 705 P.2d 766,
769 (Utah 1985). However, in some circumstances, a reviewing court may a witness credibility if
the testimony is inherently improbable. State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a civil verdict and award of judgment. The case arose in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and came to trial on January 27,
28, 29 and 30, 2004. Prior to trial. Defendant David G. Allen brought a motion for summary
judgment on the grounds that the matter was res judicata in a divorce proceeding, which was
denied (See final order). The trial court entered the order appealed from which is attached as
Exhibit "A."
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A.

SUMMARY

The parties to this action, plaintiff and defendant, David Allen, were previously husband
and wife, but were divorced by a decree of divorce entered in the Third Judicial District Court. See
Exhibit "B," decree of divorce. (Transcript of Jun Trial held January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004,
Vol. 1, p. 20, lines 13-20). The original di\orce trial court ordered that certain real property of the
couple be sqld. The Decree was admitted at trial as trial exhibit D-21.
Plaintiff brought her complaint here in issue because she alleged impropriety in the way the
land in issue was handled by her former husband, David Allen and his mother, Susan Allen.
B.

MARSHALING OF THE EVIDENCE

Defendants are mindful of their obligation to this Court, in furtherance of some of their
claims on appeal, to Marshall all of the evidence, and subsequently to argue the relative strength
and merits of the evidence. Thus, Defendants assert that the following is a MARSHALING of all
of the non-cumulative factual evidence adduced at trial, in furtherance of that obligation:
1.

* At the time of trial. Plaintiff had attended college for three years and was working

toward a bachelor's degree in business finance. She was employed as a flight attendant (Tr. Vol 1,
p. 18).
2.

Defendant David Allen ("David") had worked, "off and on" during the parties'

marriage. (Tr. Vol 1., p. 21 lines 6-8).
3.

The plaintiff and David purchased real property on 13497 South 1300 West,

8

Riverton, Salt Lake County, State of Utah (hereinafter the "Property") on October 28, 1999 for
approximately $130,000. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 99 lines 9-13). Plaintiffs mother-in-law. Defendant
Susan Allen, had acted as the Plaintiffs real estate agent for the purchase of the Propem. She had
waived her real estate commission at the time of purchase for the benefit of Plaintiff and David.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 101). Both Plaintiffs and David's names were on the title of the Propem, and the\
were co-owners. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 21). At the time the Plaintiff bought the Property, she was then
about 20 or 21 years of age. While she was going through all of the transactions listed below, she
was approximately 21 or 22 years of age. Prior to purchasing the Property, Plaintiff had never been
a homeowner before, had never had a mortgage before, and had never been a landlord before. (Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 98-99). It was also her husband, David's, first time through all of these experiences. At
all relevant times, there were two mortgage liens encumbering the Property, both with Household
Finance. There were monthly payments due for both these mortgages. While the parties were
married to each other, and up until the time of their separation, they made the monthly payments
out of a common bank account. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 22, lines 5-22). Prior to the separation of the
parties, Plaintiff and David had alread> decided to sell the Property. They signed a listing contract
with Defendant Susan Allen ("Susan") on April 10, 2001, to sell the Property. This listing contract
eventually expired. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 102 lines 4-25). Eventuall), Plaintiff had signed three listing
contracts with Defendant. Susan Allen, to sell the Propert).
4.

Plaintiff and David separated August 19. 2001. Plaintiff remained in the property

for a time, "to keep it occupied so that we would be able to keep, the upkeep on it so that we could
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try to find prospective buyers and to also take care of our dog. . . ." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 33 line through
p. 34 line 7). Plaintiff remained in the property until approximate!} January 2, 2002. (Tr. Vol. 1,
p. 34). During this time. Plaintiff had a roommate briefly in the property, a Courtney Mullein, who
also had a dog, whom the Plaintiff did not charge rent. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 34 line 12 through p. 35 line
10). The parties continued to make mortgage payments until December of 2001. After December,
the Plaintiff made no mortgage payments on the Property, and she understood that Defendant.
David, was not going to make any mortgage payments on either. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 36). Plaintiff
understood that, if the payments were not made, the mortgages would be foreclosed.
5.

Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce entered between plaintiff and David, the parties

were ordered to sell the Property, and any proceeds remaining would be divided evenly between
them. (See Decree of Divorce attached as Exhibit "B", also introduced at trial).
6.

Susan was a realtor licensed in the State of Utah. The Plaintiff and David secured

Susan's services to sell the Property pursuant to the Decree of Divorce (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 23 lines 214). The Plaintiff and David signed a Listing Agreement with Susan. The Listing Agreement was
also introduced at trial as Exhibit 1. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 24 lines 5-24). The first Listing Contract was
signed April 10th of 2001.
7.

The Listing Contract, Exhibit P-l, stated that it was to expire September 9, 2001.

Further, a box was checked on that document indicating that the property would not be made
available to rent. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 25 line 12 through p. 26 line 5). Plaintiff did not want the property
rented because it was her understanding "that a renter would actually hinder us from selling the
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property . . . ." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 26 lines 8-13).
8.

A second Listing Agreement was signed between Plaintiff and David as sellers and

Susan as a real estate agent. This Listing Contract was admitted at trial as Exhibit 2. That listing
was to commence on September 22, 2001 and terminated on March 22. 2002. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 27
line 17 through p. 28 line 8). The same box was checked on Exhibit 2. indicating that the property
was not available to rent under the Second Listing Agreement. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 28 line 20 through p.
29 line 6).
9.

Eventually, the parties signed a contract to sell the property to certain Defendants

previously involved in this case, named Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless. The date
of that contract was March 5, 2002. The contract was admitted at trial as Exhibit 3. (Tr. Vol. 1, p.
30). At the time she signed the contract to sell the property to the McCandlesses, Plaintiff knew
nothing about the McCandlesses, other than that they were interested in buying the property. (Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 31). The Contract for Sale, Exhibit 3, contained language stating, ''Buyer and Seller are
both aware that this offer is contingent upon bank approval." The purchase price of the property in
this contract was listed as $152,000. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 32).
10.

The fact that the Property was facing foreclosure due to non-payment of the

mortgages in 2002 was "a big concern" to the Plaintiff. She was worried about her credit, and did
not want her credit to be ruined. She wanted "to find some buyers and get it sold so that we could
go our separate ways without having any repercussions in that way." (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 37 lines 3-10).
11.

Prior to the offer of March. 2002. prospecth e buyers had come by and looked at the
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house, but no offers had been received. Up to March of 2002, Plaintiff was satisfied with Susan's
efforts to sell the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 37 line 15 through p. 38 line 7). Up to the point in time
when the McCandlesses bought the Property (on December 15. 2002), Plaintiff herself never found
another qualified buyer for the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149 lines 13-18).
12.

At the time the offer was received from the McCandlesses in March of 2002, no

mortgage payments had been made for Januaiy, February or March. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38 lines 8-23)..
13.

When she signed the Real Estate Purchase Contract, admitted as Exhibit 3, Plaintiff

expressed to Susan that Plaintiff was concerned about the Propert}. about her credit, and about the
Property going into foreclosure because of non-payment. She inquired about putting renters into
the Property, as an option to avoid foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 40 line 19 through p. 41 line 12). At
that time, Susan recommended against renting the Property.
14.

Plaintiff contends that she and David had one other conversation regarding the

rental of the Property, which occurred after March of 2002. In that call. Plaintiff expressed an
interest in finding some renters since the parties weren't making the payments on the Property and
she did not want the house in foreclosure. At that time. David objected to renting the Property.
(Tr. Vol. 1, p. 41 line 20 through p. 42 line 11). From the perspective of Susan Allen, she
understood Elizabeth Mueller to be instructing her to find a tenant for the Property by March of
2002 because: "she [Plaintiff] wanted to be collecting rent." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 302 line 3 through p.
304). (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 321 line 9 through p. 322 line 12).
15.

Eventually, the loan sought by the McCandlesses pursuant to the March 5, 2002
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contract (Exhibit 3) was denied. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 42 lines 12-17). On about April 5. 2002.
Defendant, David, signed a Residential Rental Agreement with the McCandlesses. introduced at
trial as Exhibit 4. The Residential Rental Agreement rented the propert} to the prospecthe buyers.
Mr. and Mrs; McCandless. The rental contract was signed onl> b\ David. (Tr. Vol. 1. p. 43-44).
It was faxed to Plaintiff by Susan on April 5, 2002. Plaintiff testified that, prior to April 5. 2002.
Susan never told the Plaintiff there was going to be a tenant in the Propert}. Susan never asked
Plaintiff if Plaintiff agreed to have a tenant in the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 45 lines 7-16). Despite
her previous conversations with Susan and David inquiring about the possibility of renting the
Property to forestall a foreclosure, Plaintiff denied at trial that she had ever given anyone
authorization to put a tenant in the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 45 lines 14-16). On April 5, 2002,
Plaintiff had a conversation with Susan about the McCandlesses moving into the Property as
tenants. This conversation was recorded by Plaintiff without the knowledge of Susan. A tape
recording of the conversation was introduced at trial as Exhibit 19. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 48). In the
course of that conversation, Susan Allen offered to Plaintiff to get the McCandlesses out of the
Property. During that conversation. Plaintiff did not instruct Susan Allen to go forward with that
offer of assistance. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 129 lines 14-22).
16.

On the evening of April 6, 2002, Plaintiff and a friend went to the Property to

observe if the McCandlesses had moved into the Propert}. and to talk to them and to see what
their understanding of the rental agreement might be. She spoke with Randy McCandless. She
observed Randy McCandless and another male moving a refrigerator or freezer into the garage.
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She informed Mr. McCandless verbalh that she had not signed the rental agreement and did not
agree with the rental contract. Mr. McCandless informed Plaintiff that he had believed Plaintiff
agreed to the contract. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 50-51).
17.

After April 5. 2002, Plaintiff returned to the Property approximately three times.

The first time is as described above. The second occasion occurred on April 8, 2002, when
Plaintiff went to the property with her father. Rhinehard Mueller. On that occasion. Plaintiff
observed that there were two males on the Propert) chasing a goat. During that \ isit, Halene
McCandlessadvised Plaintiff that she had paid SI .400 to Da\ id Allen for the rental of the Property
on April 5th, by giving a check to Susan Allen. It appeared to Plaintiff that the McCandlesses had
fully moved into the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 54, 55, 56). As of that point in time. Plaintiff was
unaware of any other contract for the McCandlesses to purchase the Property and unaware that the
McCandlesses might qualify for a loan to buy the Property. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 57 lines 9-20).
Eventually, in late April 2002, Plaintiff engaged in a telephone conversation with Susan and with a
representative of the mortgage lien holder. Household Finance, in which it was agreed that $550.00
of this first rent payment would be applied to forestall foreclosure proceedings. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 67,
68).
18.

Halene McCandless learned that Plaintiff had \ isited her home on the day the

McCandlesses moved in, ". . . and that she wasn't very pleasant." However, the McCandlesses did
not learn that Plaintiff was not agreeable to the rental agreement until after August, 2002. In fact,
Halene McCandless described standing in the kitchen of the Propert)' and discussing the cabinets in
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a "very pleasant" conversation during which Elizabeth Mueller said nothing about McCandlesses
vacating the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 195 line 12 through p. 196 line 11).
19.

The third occasion on which Plaintiff went to the Property was approximately one

month after the second, placing the incident at about May 8. 2002. Plaintiff went to the Property to
pick up her washer and dryer. She observed a horse on the Property and two dogs running on the
Property. Plaintiff understood the Property to be a "horse property," consisting of approximately
one acre. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 58 line 6 through p. 59 line 12). Plaintiff was of the opinion that it might
be a selling point for the Property, the fact that it contained an acreage and the fact that somebody
could keep animals on the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 121 lines 8-21). On one other occasion.
Plaintiff went to the Property and knocked on the back door asking to inspect the Property.
Plaintiff was denied access to the Property by Halene McCandless. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 59-60). Halene
McCandless,-referred Plaintiff to Susan Allen, and Plaintiff did not go to speak to Susan Allen
about this incident.
20.

On April 26, 2002, Plaintiff was presented with another real estate purchase

contract, eventually admitted at trial as Exhibit 6. She signed that contract. This contract also
called for the sale of the Property to the McCandlesses. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 61-62). Plaintiff testified
that her ". . . ultimate number one goal was to sell the Property and Rick [a loan officer] had told
me in the conversation that their loan was approved, and that they had been approved for this
amount, and it was going to go through, all the}' needed from me was my signature to get that
complete and my ultimate goal, like 1 said, was to sell the Property and save our credit." (Tr. Vol.
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1, p. 62 lines 17-22). David Allen also signed the Contract. This offer was also contingent upon
"bank approval."
21.

The purchase price for the new contract for sale of the Property was $160,000. The

contract called for the seller "to pay up to 6% of purchase price in closing costs for the buyer." (Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 64 lines 9-25). This contract contained a closing deadline of May 2, 2002.
22.

The McCandlesses were again declined for a loan. Plaintiff discovered this fact by

hearing about it from the mortgage lien holder. Household Finance. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 65 lines 9-24).
23.

After the two contracts for sale of the Propert> pre\ iously described had fallen

through, Plaintiff wrote a complaint to the Utah State department licensing realtors, complaining
about the conduct of Susan Allen. That letter of complaint was introduced at trial as Exhibit 8.
Plaintiff faxed the document to the Utah Division of Real Estate. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 71 lines 1-12). In
this letter, Plaintiff accused Defendant Susan of, among other things, not turning "the rental money
into her broker's trust account." Plaintiff understood that a complaint to this agency could impact
Susan's license to practice her profession. Regarding her professional license. Plaintiff said, 'Tm
assuming if they can give it, they could take it away." At the bottom of that complaint document to
that agency,(Plaintiff hand wrote three particular sentences. In the first sentence, she said "I never
signed the listing agreement." In fact, this was an inaccurate statement, in that Plaintiff had
previously signed two listing agreements for the Property with Susan. The next handwritten
sentence on the document says: "I never authorized the Property to be rented." The document did
not specify that it was David Allen, and not Susan Allen, who had signed the rental contract. The
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third sentence stated: "Susan has not turned the rental money into her broker's trust account." She
made this accusation, though the rental contract called for the rental mone\ to be paid to the
"landlord" on the contract (David Allen) and to be divided between Plaintiff and David, pursuant
to the Decree of Divorce. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 124-127).
24. '- Shortly thereafter. Plaintiff also caused a demand letter to be sent from her lawyer,
Mr. Gary Weston (admitted at trial as Exhibit 10) to Susan Allen, David Allen, and Coldwell
Banker Premium Realty (Susan Allen's employer). (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 74). In that letter. Plaintiff
complained to Susan's employer that the last listing agreement had expired in December of 2001.
(It had actually expired in the spring of 2002) In the letter, she t miplaincil that Susan had given
occupancy of the Property to the McCandlesses. In fact, Plaintiffs former husband had signed the
lease agreement with the McCandlesses. In that letter. Plaintiff accused Susan of violating the
terms and conditions of her license as issued b> the State of Utah. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 137-139). In this
letter, Plaintiff accused Susan Allen personally of "converting" the rental money. She further
directed Susan's employer that Susan should give written notice to the McCandlesses to vacate the
Property. Susan Allen never had any interest in the property whatsoever. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 142).
25.

Eventually, the Property was sold successfully to Randy N. and Halene

McCandless. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 128, lines 16-20). As a consequence of that sale, Plaintiff did not
receive any money. (Tr. Vol. 1, p. 76 lines 2-23). Plaintiff quit-claimed the Property to David to
accomplish the sale. At no time did either Defendant Allen offer to assist Plaintiff in evicting the
McCandlesses from the Property, nor did the\ pa\ Plaintiff am rent on the Propert}.
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26.

By the time the Plaintiff had signed the first sales contract with the McCandlesses.

the Property had been on the market for a total of eleven months. The list price had been dropped
from $175,000 to $165,000 (and two listings had expired at those respective prices). By the time
of the first McCandless contract. Plaintiff had been out of the Property for at least three months,
and the Property was at least three months in arrears on the mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 105-106). In
addition to arrearages in the first and second mortgage, Plaintiff and Defendant David owed back
property taxes on the Property, and Plaintiff wanted to t%sell it as soon as possible

" By March

of 2002, Plaintiff recognized that she was not likely to recover any money out of the sale of the
Property. She was ". . . willing to sell it for a base price to get the mortgage just taken care of and
sold and over with, without having any equity, and we would sell it just to get the mortgage paid
off and we were fine with that, I was fine with that." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 107 lines 1-4).
27.

By March of 2002, when she had reached this mental state, Plaintiff understood that

she and David owed a balance on the first mortgage of about $135,000, a balance on a second
mortgage of about $15,000, and at least $1,000 in back property taxes. Plaintiff and David also
owed a remaining balance for a water bill associated with the Property, and she also understood
that there would be closing costs affiliated with any sale. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 107). By the time Plaintiff
accepted the McCandlesses first offer in March 2002, Plaintiff understood that the first and second
mortgage lender. Household Finance, would have to agree to a "short sale" in order for the sales
price offered by the McCandlesses to relieve Plaintiff and David from the mortgage obligations.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 108 lines 7-22). There was a pre-payment penalty for at least one of the mortgages.
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which Household Finance would also have to forgive, in order to resolve the Plaintiffs economic
circumstances at a sales price of $160,000.
28.

By March of 2002, Plaintiff was conveying to Susan that Plaintiff". . . wanted to

sell the Property and have it sold and have it so that the mortgage compam was also happy with
the agreement, however, that would be made.'" (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 110 lines 1-3). She also gave
instructions to Susan that she wanted the Propert} sold without a foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 110
lines 9-11).
29.

Plaintiff testified at one point in time, that it was her understanding the "bank

approval'* referenced in the sales contract which would have to be obtained for sale of the Property,
was the approval of her own bank. Household Finance, to discount their mortgage in order to close
the sale. Plaintiff understood that there was some potential problem with Household Finance not
dealing with them on this issue, and she testified: "1 knew that the) would have to work with us,
that's for suite." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. I l l lines 3-14).
30.

I 'rior to vacating from the Property, the Plaintiff stopped making utility payments.

The utilities were turned off when she moved out in Januarv of 2002. Plaintiff testified that her
father came over to the Property and "winterized" everything, and that she assisted I i

i i loing

that. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 112 lines 4-24). At the point when she vacated the Property, the roof needed to
be replaced, and the real estate purchase contract disclosed that fact. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 113 lines 723). In fact, Plaintiff described the fact that the roof needed to be replaced as ^obvious." It was
also Plaintiffs belief that this "obvious" problem with the roof was one of the problems with
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getting a buyer for the Property. It was obvious from a dri\ e-b\ inspection from the street that the
roof needed replacement.
31.

The combined monthly mortgage payments for the propert} had been approximate!)

$1,400 per month. The parties had had difficulty making the mortgage payment when the two of
them were living together as husband and wife. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 114 lines 3-15).
32.

By August of 2002, Plaintiff had never stated directly to Defendants Randy or

Halene McCandless, either verbally or in writing, or to Susan Allen, that she wanted the
McCandlesses to move out of the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 132-133). By this point in time.
Plaintiff had formed the opinion that there was nothing she could do gain possession of the
Property, absent the assistance of an attorney. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 93 lines 1-9).
33.

No matter what any contract in this situation called for, Susan never actually

charged a commission to Elizabeth and David Allen for the purchase of the Property, nor did she
charge the Plaintiff and David Allen a commission for the ultimate sale of the Property. (Tr. Vol.
2, p. 135, lines 2-15).
34.

This lawsuit was filed by Plaintiff against four Defendants on September 22, 2002.

(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 168 lines 3-6).
35.

The McCandlesses were eventually able to qualify for purchase of the Property by

raising the original sales offer price from $152,000, to enable them to qualify for a loan at a certain
percentage of sales price, but to stay with their final mortgage balance of $152,000. In order to
enable this purchase finally to take place. Defendant Susan Allen and her husband came up with
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$14,000 of their own money and paid it in at closing, out of their own pocket. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 148
line 18 through p. 149 line 12).
36.

The sale of the Property actually happened in December of 2002. That sale did, in

fact, relieve Plaintiff and her former husband from the first and second mortgage obligations on the
Property, from the back property taxes owing on the Propern. and rehexed both of them from
having a foreclosure on their credit report. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 154 lines 11-25). Susan never had any
obligation to pay the mortgages on the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 155 lines 1-10). In order to
accomplish this arrangement, both mortgages on the Property had to be discounted, and the
mortgage company had to agree to forgive its pre-payment penalty. This arrangement was
negotiated in behalf of Plaintiff and David by Susan. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 155 line 11 through p. 156 line
16).
37.

From the McCandlesses* perspective, they mo\ed into the Property on April 5,

2002, pursuant to a written rental agreement signed by David Allen, as referenced above. Their
household included former Defendants Randy N. and Halene McCandless (husband and wife),
their daughter, her husband, and the McCandless' grandson. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 169 line 12-21). Both
the McCandlesses were employed, with Halene McCandless having worked for CR England
Trucking Company for seven years at the time of trial, and Randy McCandless having worked for
Sara Lee Bakery for 26 years as of the time of trial. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 170 lines 1-12). The
McCandlesses had previously been renting an acreage in Riverton. They drove by the Property one
day and saw the "For Sale" sign. The\ called Susan at the number on the sign. That was the first
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time they had met Susan. They met her at the Propert), inspected the Propert). and offered to buy
it. (Tr. Vol.,2, p. 172 lines 5-25).
38.

After offering to purchase the Property for SI52.000. the McCandlesses contacted a

loan officer at MGM through a newspaper ad. They tried to obtain FHA financing for the Propert).
but "the roof would not go." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 175 lines 8-13). About a week before the closing date
on the first contract, Halene McCandless contacted Susan Allen and told Susan Allen that the
McCandlesses had been denied a loan because they couldn't **go FHA" because of the roof on the
home not being approved. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 176 lines 9-24). The McCandlesses were worried
because their former residence in Bluffdale was being demolished, and the)' needed to move
immediately. They had located another place to move in West Valley, Utah. They were going to
buy the West Valley property, with a lease and option to purchase after one year. However, the day
before they were supposed to sign on the West Valley home, Susan called Halene McCandless and
told Ms. McCandless about a Rick Curtis who would be able to do a loan for the Property. Ms.
McCandless testified that Mr. Curtis "\ . . pretty much guaranteed both of us that he could get the
loan to go through and that he'd talked to David and Liz about us renting the house until the
Property went through and we didn't want to really live in West Valley. We wanted to live in
Riverton where we had been." Based upon this, the McCandlesses rented the Property. (Tr. Vol.
2, p. 177). The rental for the Property of $1.400 per month was suggested to the McCandlesses by
Susan, as a little higher than they had paid at their last propert). (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 179 lines 2-13).
Halene McCandless met David Allen at the Property the night before the McCandlesses moved in
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to sign the rental agreement and "pay him the mone\. . . ." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 181 lines 21-25). When
Halene McCandless signed the rental agreement for the Property, she understood, from her
conversation with Rick Curtis, that she and her husband were going to quality for a loan to
purchase the Property within thirty days, and that they could close on the house. She did not
understand what would occur after thirty days, if she and her husband were unable to close on the
Property. Halene McCandless did know that the rental agreement was the first which had ever
been written by Defendant Susan Allen, since Susan Allen disclosed to Halene McCandless that
this was the first time she had ever filled out a rental agreement form. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 189 line 20
through p. 190 line 25). Mr. McCandless was not present at the time the lease agreement was
executed and never signed the rental agreement. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 192 lines 7-15).
39.

The McCandlesses clearly understood that both the Plaintiff and David owned the

home and that each had an undivided one-half interest in the home. The McCandlesses understood
that they were divorced and that the house needed to be sold. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 178 lines 10-22).
40.

The McCandlesses were interested in the Property because it was the horse property

they had been looking for. They inspected the home and knew it was an older home. They knew
the roof needed repair. They were unwilling to pay more than $152,000 for the Property, in its
condition, and ". . . that's how it's been the whole time." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 180 lines 9-19).
41.

At the point when she was ready to move into the Property, Halene McCandless

went to the City of Riverton to have the water turned on, but was told there was an outstanding bill.
She testified either Susan Allen or David Allen paid it, because Halene McCandless was then able
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to have the water turned on. When she returned to the house from having the water connected, a
pipe burst and flooded the whole kitchen. "It was dripping e\er\ where." Halene VlcCandless had
to go to the neighbor next door who came over and turned the water off so that it would quit
flooding. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 182 lines 6-20).
42.

The McCandlesses signed an agency disclosure agreement on March 2, 2002 with

Susan Allen, which was introduced at trial as Exhibit 14. This disclosure agreement appointed
Susan Allen as the McCandless' realtor, and required the McCandlesses to pay Susan Allen a
commission for the purchase of the Property. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 187 line 2 through p. 188 line 6).
43.

After the McCandlesses moved into the Property, they executed another real estate

purchase contract on about April 27, 2002. (Exhibit 6 at trial). When they executed this contract,
the McCandlesses knew that the first loan had been disapproved. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 196 lines 12-24).
The McCandlesses increased the offer on the Property from the original of $152,000 to $160,000,
"for the loan." Ms. McCandless understood that this increase in the purchase price was necessary
so that the loan would go through. However, Ms. McCandless understood that she would still have
to have 100% financing of the $152,000 she would undertake as a loan for the Property. (Tr. Vol.
2, p. 198 lines 1-24, p. 199 lines 14-19). The McCandlesses did not understand, at the time of the
second real estate purchase contract, that there would be any problem with obtaining a loan due to
their credit. -Ms. McCandless understood that the reason the first loan had been denied was
because they had tried for an FHA loan, and the Property would not qualify for such a loan because
of the condition of the roof. "It had nothing to do with our credit then." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 200 lines
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11-19).
44.

The McCandlesses found out about problems with their credit about a month or six

weeks after the second loan application, when they found out that the second application had been
denied. Rick Curtis, the mortgage broker, advised Ms. McCandless of the loan denial. However,
when the second loan application was denied. Mr. Curtis "just said that he knew he could get it
through this other company. That's how it went for even- time." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 201 lines 2-17).

45.

The McCandlesses continued to remain in the Property after two loan applications

:>een declined bIs McCandless kept being told that "he was certain that we could get" the
loan. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 233 lines 14-18). However, Defendant Susan never assured the McCandlesses
that they would get a loan (Tr Vol. 2. p. 233 lines 19-21). The Mc( andlesses did not even
unpack their boxes until Christmas Day of 2002, almost nine months after they moved into the
Property. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 201 lines 18-25). Every time the loan applications were disapproved, the
McCandlesses would talk to their loan officer. Rick, and "Rick talked to Sue." The McCandlesses
did not speak directly to Sue about this problem. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 202 lines 1 -9).
46.

In the meantime, the McCandlesses had made the one rental payment of $1,400 on

April 5th. They handed the first payment to Susan, and the remaining payments to David. (Tr. Vol.
2, p. 202 lines 10-17). They made no rental payments in May, June, July or August. The
McCandlesses paid an additional $2,800 rent in September. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 203 lines 8-19).
Though the McCandlesses did not pay rent for May. June. July or August. Ms. McCandless
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perceived that t%we did stuff to the house." (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 204 lines 19-25). It is clear that Ms.
McCandless believed she was entitled to some offset of the rent b\ reason of the condition of the
house. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 225 lines 6-11) and (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 239 lines 2-9).
47.

For example, a few weeks after they moved in, the McCandlesses endured a

situation where numerous repairs had to be made to the Property. The sump pump went out, a
downstairs shower was leaking through the wall, and the ceiling fell into the kitchen from roof
and water damage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 204 lines 4-25). Water leaked down the coal chute, so that Mr.
McCandless had to dig out around the foundation and cement it all in. Trees fell in the backyard.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 205 lines 1-8). Mr. McCandless paid for the roof repair and provided the labor to
repair the roof. The yard needed to be totally retained and landscaped. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 205 lines 1117) and (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 277 line 10 through p. 286).
48.

Susan never told the McCandlesses that the) did not have to pay rent. (Tr. Vol. 2,

p. 225 lines 2-3).

49.

On July 30, 2002, the McCandlesses learned that the Property was in foreclosure

because a notice was taped to the door. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 207 lines 9-17). One of the foreclosure
notices was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 7.
50.

Eventually, in August 2002. Plaintiff caused her attorney to send a letter to the

McCandlesses. That letter was introduced at trial as Exhibit 9. The McCandlesses did not respond
to Plaintiff or to her attorney, but Ms. McCandless did tell Susan of the letter and did tell her loan
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officer. Rick Curtis. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 221 line 5 through p. 222 line 14). Ms. McCandless did not
respond to the letter because Rick Curtis had told her he would get in touch with Plaintiffs
counsel. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 223 lines 8-18). Mr. Curtis was still telling Ms. McCandless that "things
were going in order" and that the McCandlesses were going to be able to purchase the Property.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 230 lines 14-23).
51.

Officially, Elizabeth Mueller caused the McCandlesses to be served with a notice to

pay delinquent rent or to quit possession on August 23, 2002. The notice to pay rent or quit was
introduced at trial as Exhibit 15. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 226 lines 4-21). By this point, Ms. McCandless
did not perceive that she was dealing with anyone about the house other than David. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.
228 lines 1-25 through p. 229 line 10). At this time, the McCandlesses still wanted to buy the
Property. After the McCandlesses were served with the notice to vacate or quit, the McCandlesses
had a conversation with David. He came by in early September to pick up a rent payment, and was
informed by the McCandlesses that they were still trying to buy the house and that David still
should not lu\ t (IK house go into foreclosure. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 229 lines 18-23).
52.

The McCandlesses were still being told by Rick Curtis that "he was trying to take

care of it all." (Tr. '/ol. 2, p. 230 lines 18-23). However, Halene McCandless agreed that, if Sue
Allen or David Allen had ever told her that she hadn't paid rent, and that it didn't look like the loan
was going to go through, she would have moved out. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 233 lines 1-7).
53.

Eventually, David requested another rental payment from the McCandlesses, which

occurred on November 29, 2002. On that occasion, the McCandlesses paid David another $1,400
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in rent. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 239 lines 10-25). By November 29th, the McCandlesses were still telling
David that they wanted to buy the house and that they did not want it to go into foreclosure. (Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 241 lines 6-20). By that point, the McCandlesses had been served with this lawsuit, on
about October 2nd.
54.

The third offer was not prepared by Susan Allen. It was prepared by David at the

direction of his mortgage lender, and Susan was not involved with that process. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 345
line 15 through p. 346 line 11).
55.

When the McCandlesses finally purchased the Property in December of 2002, the

McCandlesses signed a "HUD Settlement Statements This was introduced at trial as Exhibit 11.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 244 lines 4-25). The closing of the Property occurred at Bachman Stewart Title
Company. Present at the closing were the two McCandlesses, Defendants David Allen and Susan
Allen, and the escrow closing officer. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 245 lines 1-22). The escrow agent was Susan
Allen's relative, who worked for the title company. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 271 lines 6-23). This closing
was conducted pursuant to yet another real estate sales contract, the one prepared by David, which
was introduced at trial as Exhibit 20, and dated November 25, 2002. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 246 lines 125). According to Ms. McCandless' understanding, the sales price was increased to $169,700, so
that the loan would go through. Ms. McCandless understood that she would still have to pay
$152,000 for the house. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 247 lines 1-25 through p. 248 line 17). Ms. McCandless
understood that the purchase price and the total arrangement came from the suggestion of Rick
Curtis, the loan officer. Exhibit 20, the HUD Closing Statement, talked about seller financing in
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the amount of $8,185.00. The McCandlesses were to recehe a mortgage loan for $152,750. (See
Exhibit 20). Sue Allen waived all commissions, despite her contracts entitling her to receive
commissions. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 251 lines 2-13). No assessment for back rent appears on the
settlement statement. Ms. McCandless understood that, with the closing, "we don't owe them am
money. We bought the house. There was no money owed at all." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 252 lines 4-16).
In conjunction with the closing, the McCandlesses executed a Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note,
introduced at trial as Plaintiffs Exhibits 17 and 18. Pursuant to the Trust Deed Note, the
McCandlesses owed David G. Allen $8,485 (clearly for the seller financing referenced in the HUD
Closing Statement, Exhibit 20). However, Ms. McCandless expressed her understanding at trial
that she did not actually have to pay this amount, based on statements made to her by David. (Tr.
Vol. 2, p. 253 lines 1 through p. 255 line 23) and (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 255 lines 4-23). The HUD
settlement sheet also called for the buyers to bring $ 14,108.19 to the closing. (This was
accomplished by the cashier's check from the Aliens.) (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 265 line 3 through p. 266
line 23). Specifically, a check was made payable to Rand} McCandless from MCA Construction,
Inc. in the amount of $14,100 dated December 16, 2002. It was introduced at trial as Exhibit 16.
(Tr. Vol. 2, p. 261 line 16 through p. 263 line 25). This money was given to the McCandlesses by
the Aliens, and the McCandlesses in turn took these funds to closing. The McCandlesses never
fully understood why they received the check for $14,100 from Susan and her husband. (Tr. Vol.
2, p. 267 lines 2-25). The HUD statement also provided that property taxes due for 2001 and 2002
would be paid, in the sums of $1,421.00 and $1,248.00, respectively. There was also a past due
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assessment of the South Valley Sewer District for a water bill, and that was also collected at the
time of the closing. (Tr. Vol. 2. p. 276).
56.

During the conversations that the McCandlesses had with Plaintiff. Plaintiff had

occasion to tell Mrs. McCandless that she hated her ex-husband David, and that the only person
she hated more than David was his mother. Susan Allen. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 296 lines 5-10).
57.

During a substantial portion of the time that the McCandlesses were attempting to

qualify for a mortgage, Susan was not aware of their financial inability to qualify for a mortgage.
In fact it was Susan's understanding at the time of their first application that the McCandlesses had
already pre-qualified for a mortgage with a person named Mike at MTM mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 2, p.
304 line 10 through p. 305 line 12).
58.

During all of the ordeal of attempting to have the McCandlesses qualify to purchase

the Property; Susan and her son, David, continued to work with the McCandlesses because theirs
was "the only offer" and their attempts to purchase the Property were "the best bet." (Tr. Vol. 2, p.
343 line 14 through p. 344 line 2).
59.

On the very last contract and transaction which resulted in the sale of the Property,

Susan Allen was not the real estate agent. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 349).
60.

As an explanation of her damages, Plaintiff introduced summary exhibits at trial,

including enlarged exhibits 12 and 13. From those exhibits. Plaintiff testified to a summary of her
damages in the case as follows: she wanted to collect from Defendants David Allen and Susan
Allen $700.00 per month as rent for the Property for April. May, June, July, August, September,
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October, November, and December. 2002. through December 15th. (On December 15th. the
McCandlesses purchased the Property). Plaintiff wanted to recover these funds, less $275.00
advanced to Household Finance from the Defendants. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 144 line 4 through p. 146 line
7). The total amount claimed by Plaintiff for rental was $5,581.00. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 147 lines 1524). In addition to back rent, Plaintiff claimed in her summary of damages that she should receive
one-half the "equity" in the real property of $25,895.00, pursuant to the Decree of Divorce between
herself and David Allen. However, Plaintiff also agreed that the "equity" would not have existed
but for Susan Allen and her husband bringing $14,000 to the closing, and that, with regard to this
$14,000, "they should get paid back." (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 149 line 25 through page 150 line 19).
Within minutes, however, Plaintiff also testified that she did not feel the $14,000 brought to the
closing was her responsibility. She felt the agreement that David, his parents and the
McCandlesses had was between them, and that she was not involved with that. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 153
lines 12-21). Effectively, Plaintiff testified that she did not have any responsibility to save her own
property from foreclosure and to save her own credit rating.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The verdict and instructions to the jury are in error. Defendant, David Allen, cannot have
trespassed on his own land, as a matter of law, and his mother cannot have trespassed, since she
acted with David's permission.
The Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction in this case, and this case was estopped
because the matter should have been heard as an enforcement of the divorce action between
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Plaintiff and David Allen.
The jury verdict is not supported by the evidence in this case. The punitive damage award
is especially egregious in this regard, and is so excessive as to be unconstitutional.

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE PLAINTIFF COULD NOT RECOVER AGAINST DEFENDANTS
FOR TRESPASS, AS A MATTER OF LAW.

Utah law states that "the essential element of trespass is physical invasion of the land;
'trespass is a possessory action.'" Walker Drug Company, Inc. v. La Sal Oil Company, 972 P.2d
1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (quoting John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf. 615 P.2d 1210, 1214
(1980) ("The gist of an action of trespass is infringement on the right of possession.")). Included in
this right of possession is the right to exclude.
The present case is similar to cases where a landowner has sued the owner of an easement
because both parties own certain interests in the same piece of property. Moreover, the dispute
here arises over what rights the parties have in regard to each other. Easements are limited to the
terms of the contract between the parties that may say what the easement can be used for or that
only certain people may use the easement. In other situations the owner of the easement may have
unlimited rights regarding the easement.
In Broadbent Land Company \. The Town of Manila and Daggett County, 842 P.2d 907,
908 Utah 19,92), the plaintiff owned a piece of property subject to an easement owned by Daggett
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County that ran through plaintiffs propert). Daggett Count) had ownership rights over this
easement allowing it to say who could or could not enter onto the land, subject to the terms of the
easement. In Broadbent, 842 P.2d 908. Daggett County allowed the town of Manila to install an
underground sewage line within the boundaries of the easement. The plaintiff sued for trespass.
The Supreme Court of Utah found that, because Daggett County had acted within its scope of
rights as the owner of the easement, plaintiff had no right to exclude Daggett County from its
possession of the easement. Included in this right was Daggett County's right to exclude other
parties from the easement or to allow others, like the town of Manila, to enter onto the property.
The present case is comparable to Broadbent in that the dispute is over a control
disagreement between two parties regarding the same piece of property. The Plaintiff and
Defendant, David Allen, co-owned the property. Both parties had the right to possess the property
and to exclude others from entering the property. However, Plaintiff had no right to exclude David
Allen from the property because of his ownership interest. Likewise, David Allen has no right to
exclude Plaintiff from the property because of her ownership interest. Furthermore, if one of the
co-owners of the property gave consent to a third-party to enter the property, the other owner
cannot exclude that person. Such a denial would be inconsistent with either party's ownership
interest. David acted consistently with his ownership interest in the property when he gave consent
to his mother, Susan, to enter the property.
Surrounding jurisdictions have commented on the obviousness of the right of an owner of
property to give permission to third parties to enter the property; "Consent is, of course, an
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absolute defense to an action for trespass provided the consent is given by the possessor of the land
. . . provided further that the acts of the party accused of the trespass do not exceed, or are not in
conflict with, the purposes for which such consent was given." Belluomo v. Kake TV & Radio,
Inc., 596 P.2d 832. 840 (Ct. App. Kansas 1979).
Plaintiff has no right to exclude David from a property he owns. Furthermore, Plaintiff has
no right to exclude a third-party invited onto the property by an owner, absent some prior contract
stipulating that right to the owners of the property. Therefore, under Utah law. no trespass occurs
where one owner of a piece of property excludes another owner of that same property, and with the
same rights to that property, or any third party invited onto that property.
Here, Plaintiffs entire recovery is predicated on Defendants Aliens' supposed "trespass."
This trespass finding cannot stand as a matter of law. The trial court's instructions to the jury on
the law of trespass were predicated on the legal error that Defendants could trespass against
Plaintiffs property interest under the facts of this case. In this regard, the jury instructions were in
error.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT LACKED SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
OF THE PROPERTY ISSUES HEREIN.

Because Plaintiff and Defendant, David G. Allen, filed for divorce and obtained a final
order, the court in the divorce action had continuing jurisdiction to resolve disputes between
Plaintiff and Defendant over their decree and their marital property. Utah Code Annotated,
§30-3-5.
The trial court should have found that the divorce court had the only subject matter
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jurisdiction over the dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants, regarding the marital home The
marital home had been ordered sold. All of this really involves an argument over enforcement
of a divorce decree-the sale of the property pursuant to the decree.
For this reason, all claims and causes of action by Plaintiff should have been dismissed
with prejudice, with the understanding Plaintiff always could seek to modify or enforce the
decree of divorce in the divorce action.
Further, the final order in the divorce case is the operative order regarding the real estate
in issue; therefore, the divorce decree was res judicata as to that issue, and these proceedings
should have been collaterally estopped by the divorce decree.
The issues in dispute here were clearly addressed between Plaintiff and Defendant, David
Allen, in the divorce lawsuit. All issues of what to do between said parties, regarding the
property, were resolved in the divorce action and cannot be addressed here under the doctrine of
res judicata.
The doctrine of res judicata is designed to prevent parties to lawsuits from getting "a
second bite of the apple." Plaintiff was permitted to sue here over issues pertaining to her
former marital residence, when these issues had already been decided in the divorce. She was
given a "second bite." This is clearly improper.
This situation raises the possibility of conflicting court orders on the same topic between
the same parties. This Court, theoretically, could enter an order about the marital residence
conflicting with the divorce court's existing order or a future modification order in the divorce.
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Such must be avoided.
Because all the claims of Plaintiff violate collateral estoppel, jurisdiction and res judicata
doctrines this case should have been dismissed. The trial court erred in failing to dismiss
Plaintiffs claims.
POINT III

THE VERDICT IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE

As set forth in the Statement of Facts abo\ e. it is clear that the Propert\ in issue was an
extremely distressed property, difficult to sell. An extraordinary list of problems existed with the
Property and occurred to the new purchasers (the McCandlesses) immediately after they occupied
the Property. The Property would not qualify for FHA financing, and thus had to qualify with
conventional and/or "B-loan" status.
It could be argued that David Allen and/or his mother, Susan Allen, should have somehow
found a better buyer for the Property. The problem is that a better buyer would likely not have
accepted the Property. A buyer not exactly like the McCandlesses (who desperately wanted a horse
property, were obviously quite handy at dealing with household repairs, and who were sufficiently
financially distressed that they could not easily go elsewhere) were the only kinds of buyers who
might be interested in this Property under these circumstances.
It is absolutely undisputed from the evidence at trial that the Plaintiff herself never found
her mythical better buyer to purchase this Property. It is absolutely undisputed that no other person
other than the McCandlesses ever came forward and made an offer to purchase the Property.
It is also absolutely undisputed that, but for David Allen taking control of the situation and
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placing the McCandlesses in the Property, and but for the efforts of Susan Allen to bring cash to
the closing, this sale would never have happened, and both Plaintiff and Defendant David Allen
would have been worse off. They would like have owed a deficienc\ on the Property to the
mortgage lien holders after foreclosure, as well as owing propert) taxes and utilities liens against
the Property. They also would have suffered a foreclosure upon their credit rating.
Elizabeth Mueller herself testified repeatedly that her sole goal through this entire process
was simply to be out from under the Property - to have the mortgages satisfied, to have no further
obligation with the Property, and to avoid the added disability- of a foreclosure upon her credit
report and credit rating. All of this was accomplished for her. through no help of the Plaintiff and,
in fact, in th6 face of her efforts to hinder the process. All of this was accomplished by her former
husband, David Allen, and her former mother-in-law. Susan Allen.
After having accomplished all of her stated purposes and stated goals in this case, Plaintiff
continued to pursue this case through trial and has obtained a judgment against the Defendants
Allen for a total of $55,000, most of it in the form of punitive damages. Under the totality of the
evidence in this case, as marshalled above, there is absolutely no factual basis for the jury to have
found any wrongdoing on the part of the Defendants Allen, whatsoever. It is clear that, since the
evidence does not support the jury's finding in any regard, the \erdict must have been the result of
passion or prejudice on the part of the jury7. This Court should reverse a jury verdict not supported
by the evidence and should remand the case with instructions to the trial court to vacate the verdict,
and/or to retrv the case.
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At the very least, in the instant circumstance, the matter should be remanded to vacate, or in
the alternative, to reassess the punitive damages award herein.
There is no proof whatsoever that the Defendant David Allen or the Defendant Susan Allen
acted with any animus toward the Plaintiff or with any kind of bad faith. On the contrary, the only
evidence of animus in this case is that the Plaintiff hated her former husband. David Allen, and
hated his mother more. Nothing whatsoever in the evidence demonstrates the kind of willful,
deliberate or malicious behavior, or disregard for the rights of another, which would support any
kind of award of punitive damages.
It is clear that compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiffs loss, while
punitive damages are aimed at the different purpose of deterence and retribution. In this case, the
jury awarded a compensatory judgment against David G. Allen (reflected in paragraph 1 of the
Judgment on Special Verdict, in the sum of $8,100.00.
It is also clear that the jury awarded Plaintiff compensatory damages jointly and severally
against David G. Allen and Susan S. Allen for trespass in the sum of $10,000.00, as referenced in
paragraph 2 of the Order. (As noted in Point I above, no judgment should be permitted to stand in
this case based upon trespass).
The jury, in paragraphs 3 and 4, awarded judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against
Defendant David G. Allen for $5,000 and against Defendant Susan S. Allen for $30,000. Due to
the nature of the special verdict in this case, it is clear that an award of punitive damages, if it
stands at all, must stand on the basis of the trespass found to have been committed by Defendants
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against the real property rights of the Plaintiff Such cannot be sustained here.
The United States Supreme Court noted in the case of State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Company v. Campbell et aL. 538 U.S. 408 (2003). that punithe damages pose an acute
danger of arbitrary deprivation of property which is heightened when a decision maker is presented
with evidence having little bearing on the amount that should be awarded. Thus, appellate courts
must review punitive damages to consider the degree of reprehensibility of the alleged misconduct,
the disparity between the actual or potential harm and the punitive damage award, and the
difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or
imposed in comparable cases.
In determining a Defendant's reprehensibility for purposes of assessing punitive damages,
an appellate court must consider the reasonableness of the award, and in considering the reasonable
of the award, an appellate court must consider:
1.

Whether the harm was physical rather than economic. In the instant case, Plaintiff

makes absolutely no claim whatsoever of physical injury;
2.

Whether the tortious conduct evidenced by the defendant demonstrates an

indifference to or a reckless disregard for the health or safety of others. In the instant case, there is
absolutely no claim of indifference to the health or safety of other persons;
3.

Whether the conduct involves repeated actions or was an isolated incident. In the

instant case, the only action complained of is a continuing course of conduct involving a single
parcel of real property and continuing efforts to sell that property to one particular buyer, pursuant
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to a direct order in a decree of divorce, and to avoid foreclosure. There is no indication of am
intention on the part of the Defendants to continue in any similar course of conduct with other
persons; and
4.

Whether am harm resulted from intentional malice, trickery or deceit, or mereh

from an accident. In the instant case, it is arguable that no harm resulted to the Plaintiff
whatsoever. Ironically, if she had had her way (or what she claimed at trial she had wanted), there
would have been no tenant to pay any rent into the Property at all from April through December of
2002. Thus, there would have been no money to extend the foreclosure past May of 2002, and the
Property would have been foreclosed at that point in time. Had the Plaintiff received what she
claims she wanted, her former in-laws would not have stepped forward with a loan of $14,000 to
allow the McCandlesses to close the Property, and the Property would simply have been
foreclosed. The Plaintiff is, ironically, in a much better position today (without consideration of
the judgments entered in her favor) than she would have held had the McCandlesses been kept out
of the Property, and had Defendant Susan Allen simply stayed out of the transaction altogether.
Had Plaintiff truly received what she wanted, she would owe a deficiency judgment to her
mortgage lienholder, would owe back property taxes for the real estate, would owe money to the
utility company, and would have a foreclosure on her credit report. The Plaintiff is in a better
position today than she would have occupied, but for the Defendants1 alleged misconduct. Thus,
as there is no harm to the Plaintiff from the Defendants' conduct, it cannot be said that any harm
resulted from intentional malice, trickery or deceit. Even assuming all of the evidence in the light
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most favorable to Plaintiffs claim, as this Court is certainly required to do. the Defendants are. at
best, guilty of hurting Plaintiffs feelings by eventually tning to sell the Propert\ without including
her "in the loop," after she had reported Susan to her professional licensing board, to her employer,
and had had her attorney threaten to sue them. This kind of conduct on the part of the Defendants
is not such as should allow for punitive damages at all;
5.

It should be presumed in the law that a plaintiff has been made whole by

compensatory damages, so punitive damages should be awarded only if the defendant's culpability
is so horrible as to warrant the imposition of further sanctions to achieve punishment or deterrence.
Defendant David Allen, under the facts of this case, is merely "guilty" of attempting to follow the
terms of his Decree of Divorce and selling the property to avoid foreclosure. His mother, Susan
Allen, is merely "guilty" of attempting to achieve his goals of avoiding foreclosure and of bringing
$14,000 of her own money to the table to do so. Under these circumstances, the compensatory
damages alone (found in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the final order) are certainly more than adequate to
compensate for any damages found by the jury, and the punitive damages are unnecessary because
punishment and deterrence in this case are unnecessary.
In the Campbell case, supra, the United States Supreme Court found that the insurance
company's handling of claims against the Campbells did not merit any praise, but that a modest
punishment would have satisfied the go\ ernmenf s legitimate objectives. Here, in the instant case,
the conduct of the Defendants does not even merit a modest punishment. Here, the Defendant
David Allen's only conduct is attempting to sell a highly distressed property under impossible
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circumstances without cooperation from his former wife. Susan Allen's onh conduct is to attempt
to assist her son in accomplishing these goals, and to put her own mone\ into the process.
Further, the Campbell case makes clear that the courts may not allow the punishment of a
defendant for conduct which may ha\ e been lawful when and where it occurred. As noted above,
in the instant case, David Allen was specifically authorized and ordered by the Decree of Divorce
to sell the Property. Nothing in his behavior is so outside the realm of reasonableness in selling
this Property that it should be punished with anything more than compensator) damages.
The sole basis for punitive damages, further, as against the Defendants Allen is their
putative "trespass" upon the Property. As noted above, since David Allen's entry on the Property
was always lawful. Pursuant to his title interest, and Susan Allen's activities with the Property
were always with the blessing of a title owner (David Allen) and her understanding that she had the
consent of the other title owner, none of her behavior can be found to have been unlawful when
and where it occurred. The State, through these courts, has no legitimate concern in imposing
punitive damages under the facts in this case, against either Defendant. Defendants concede that
there is no concrete constitutional limit established in the Campbell decision, or elsewhere, on the
ratio between harm or potential harm to the Plaintiff, and a punitive damages award. Defendants
will also concede that the court in Campbell appears to have approved single digit multipliers as
reasonable for punitive damages award. However, this does not absolve the Plaintiff from scrutiny
of these punitive damages under the other criteria set forth in Campbell, and set forth in BMW of
North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996). Even if the punitive damages awarded are
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grounded in a single digit multiplier, this Court must still apply all of the proper analysis. Under
the facts of this case, the punitive damages award cannot stand as lawful or constitutional.
In the instant case. Susan Allen was found to owe jointly and severally the sum of $10,000
(or $5,000, if divided equally with her co-defendant) for compensator) damages for trespass. She
was ordered to pay six times this sum. or $30,000, in punitive damages, a grosslx excessive
punitive damage award given the totality of the compensatory award granted against Susan Allen,
and given the totality of the circumstances.
An additional guidepost for determination of the reasonableness of a punitive damages
award is the difference between punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties
authorized or imposed in comparable cases. As noted in the Campbell case itself, the most recent
punitive damages award as of that 2003 decision, flowing out of the courts of the State of Utah,
was a $10,000 punitive damages award for what the United States Supreme Court described as
"grand fraud." Defendant Susan Allen here committed nothing so serious as the "grand fraud"
described by the Supreme Court in the Campbell case. Surely, if "grand fraud" is worth $10,000 in
punitive damages in the State of Utah as a comparable award. Defendant Susan Allen cannot be
assessed three times that sum in this jurisdiction for these facts and circumstances.
Further, the award of punitive damages in this case violates Utah Code Annotated Section
78-18-1, et. seq, in that the damages awarded here are not based upon proof by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the Defendants are the result of willful and
malicious or intentionally fraudulent conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and reckless
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indifference toward and disregard of the rights of others. The violation of this Utah statuton
provision has occurred for all of the reasons cited in the foregoing analysis.
For all of the foregoing reasons, this Court should find that the evidence does not support
any of the judgments against the Defendants Allen. In the alternative, and at the very least, this
Court should find that the punitive damages awards do not meet the criteria of the United States
Supreme Court for assessment of punitive damages and are. therefore, unconstitutional as
excessive and as a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the case should be remanded to the trial court to vacate the
judgment as a matter of law. In the alternative, the case should be remanded to vacate the punitive
damages awarded. In the alternative, the matter should be remanded for new trial.
DATED this

day of December, 2004.
CORPORON & WILLIAMS. P.C.

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney for Defendants/Appellants
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fN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ELIZABETH RUTH MUELLER, also
known as ELIZABETH MUELLER,
formerly known as ELIZABETH RUTH
M. ALLEN.
Plaintiff,
\s.
DAVID G. ALLEN: SUSAN S. ALLEN;
RANDY N. McCANDLESS, and
HALENE McCANDLESS,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL VERDICT

Civil No. 020910005 EV
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

This case was tried to the Court, before the Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki, sitting with a
jury, on January 27, 28, 29 and 30, 2004. Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, was represented hy
Gary A. Weston of the firm of Nielsen & Senior. Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S.
Allen, were represented by Mary C Corporon of the firm of Corporon & Williams. Defenaants,
Randy N. McCandless and Halene McCandless, appeared pro se and without counsel.
After commencement of trial. Defendant David G. Allen withdrew his counterclaim
against the Plaintiff and the Court denied Plaintiff leave to introduce evidence with regard to the
Judgment on Special Verdict (4 parts) @J
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counterclaim. Upon the completion of the evidence, the Court further considered Plaintiffs
motion in limine directed at Defendant Susan S. Allen's claim for abuse of process. Upon
motion of the Plaintiff, the Court dismissed the claim with prejudice, treating the motion as one
to dismiss and determining that neither law or evidence had been submitted sufficient to support
the claim. Defendants David G. Allen and Susan S. Allen renewed their motion that the Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Court had long before denied said Defendants' motion.
Notwithstanding, the Court heard argument of counsel and again denied the motion.
Having submitted issues to the jury for its special verdict relative to the First, Second and
Third Claims for Relief of Plaintiffs complaint against Defendants and the Second and Third
Causes of Action of Defendant Susan S. Allen's counterclaim against Plaintiff, and the jury
having duly rendered its verdict on January 30, 2004;
NOW, THEREFORE, in accordance with the special verdict of the jury, it is hereby
ordered and adjudged:
1.

Plaintiff, Elizabeth Ruth Mueller, have and recover from Defendant, David G.

Allen, the sum of Eight Thousand One Hundred Dollars ($8,100.00) as found by the jury.
2.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, David G. Allen and Susan S.

Allen, jointly and severally, the sum of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00) as found by the jury.
3.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, David G. Allen, punitive damages

in the sum of Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) as found by the jury.
4.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendant, Susan S. Allen, punitive damages

in the sum of Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) as found by the jury.

•lSS2-OH?0-553f).VH':204.(X)l

"-"

5.

Plaintiff have and recover from the Defendants, Randy N. McCandless and

Halene VIcCandless, jointly and severally, the sum of Eight Thousand Five Hundred Fifty
Dollars (S8.550.00), consisting of rental in the amount of Nine Hundred Dollars ($900.00) owing
to Plaintiff for the period of time prior to Defendants McCandless unlawfully detaining
possession of the property subject of the Plaintiffs complaint, and Seven Thousand Six Hundred
Fifty Dollars (57,650.00) for unlawfully detaining possession, all as found by the jury.
6.

Plaintiff have and recover costs and disbursements as allowed by the Court.

This judgment shall bear interest from and after its date at the rate provided in
Section 15-1-4(3), UTAH CODE ANN.
DATED this £ '
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day of February, 2004.
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David G. i „n
14615 S. 2200 West
Bluffdale, Utah 84065 ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
801-253-5845
DATE
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

David G. Allen,
Petitioner,

*

DECREE OF DIVORCE
AND JUDGMENT

Case No.

vs.
*

Elizabeth Ruih M. Allen,
Respondent.

fyl^/lQ?//!

Judge:

*

The above-entitled matter came on before the court on Petitioner's Affidavit for Entry of
Divorce Decree in accordance with Rule 4-913 Code of Judicial Administration. More than
ninety days have passed since this matter was filed with the Court or Petitioner's motion to waive
the 90-day waiting period was granted. The Court, having found and entered it Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law and being otherwise fully advised, it is hereby,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
That the Pe^tioner is hereby awarded a Decree of Divorce from the Respondent, such to
become final upon signature and entry herein.
1. During the course of the marriage relationship, the parties have acquired certain
items of personal property. Said personal property of the parties is awarded as follows:

Description of Item
1986 Chevy S10 pickup

Item Becomes Sole Property of
Petitioner

Suzuki 250 motorcycle

Petitioner

bedroom set

Respondent

9/22/2001
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• inline Court Assistance Program
big screen tv

Respondent

vcr

Respondent

refrigerator

Respondent

washer and dryer

Respondent

all Household items

Respondent

pedigreed boxer dog

Respondent

dog run

Respondent

All other personal property should be divided as the parties have already divided it
2. During the course of the marriage, the parties have acquired certain debts and
obligations. Each party is ordered to assume and pay the debts and hold the other harmless from
liability as follows:

To Whom Debt is Owed
1 Discover Card

Description of Debt
Credit card

Debt Becomes Sole
Responsibility of
Respondent

All other debts are the responsibility of the person incurring the debt.
3. During the course of the marriage, the parties acquired the following real property:
a. A home located at 13408 S. 1300 West, Riverton, UTAH 84065 more
particularly described by the following legal description- Lot 1, Silcox Meadows
9/22/2001

Decree of Divorce and Judgment
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>niine Court Assistance Program

Sub.
7842-2385 7947-0892 7971-0369 8294-1736
b The property shall be sold as soon as reasonably practicable and the
proceeds of the sale applied as follows
1 First, to pay expenses of sale,
2 Second, to retire any and all mortgages and liens,
3 Third, to pay all marital debts and obligations,
4 Last, any balance remaining shall be divided equally between the
parties.
4. Neither party should be awarded alimony from the other.
5. The parties have acquired no interest in any pension or profit sharing plan during the
course of the marriage.
6. There are no children at issue in this marriage.
7. Neither the Petitioner nor the Respondent has received or is receiving public
assistance from the State of Utah.
8. Prior to any Petition being filed to change any provision of the final Decree of
Divorce, the parties must attempt to resolve the issue through mediation.

9. Respondent is restored the use of the fonner name of Elizabeth Ruth Mueller.

DATED this

9/22/2001

Decree of Divorce and Judgment
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miine Court Assistance Program

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/DELIVERY
On this

da}' of

,

. a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Decree of Divorce and Judgment was mailed, postage prepaid or delivered to
Respondent at 13408 S 1300 West, Riverton, Utah 84065
Petitioner Signature

9/22/2001

Decree of Divorce and Judgment
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HUSBAND AND WIFE

30-3-4

the action. The order may include provision for costs of the
action.
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, parent-time,
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon
determining that the party substantially prevailed upon the
claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award no
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees.
(3) In any action listed in Subsection (1), the court may
order a party to provide money, during the pendency of the
action, for the separate support and maintenance of the other
party and of any children in the custody of the other party.
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entry of the
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of
the action or in the final order or judgment.
2001
30-3-4.

P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — Decree — U s e of affidavit — Sealing.
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed by the
petitioner or petitioner's attorney.
(b) A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken in the
cause. If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be submitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the approval of the court.
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent have a child or
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both
parties have attended the mandatory course described in
Section 30-3-11.3, and have presented a certificate of
course completion to the court. The court may waive this
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of
the parties, if it determines course attendance and completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible, or in the
best interest of the parties.
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council. The
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's
affidavit.
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by
order of the court upon the motion of either party. The sealed
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or
attorney filing a notice of appearance in the action, the Office
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full
access to the entire record. This sealing does not apply to
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree.
1997
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4.
30-3-5.

Repealed.

1990

Disposition of property — M a i n t e n a n c e and
health care of parties and children — Division of debts — Court to have c o n t i n u i n g
j u r i s d i c t i o n — Custody and parent-time —
D e t e r m i n a t i o n of alimony — N o n m e r i t o r i o u s
petition for modification.
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may
include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property,
debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the
following m every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of
the dependent children;
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(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance
for the dependent children;
(O pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible
for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during
marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding
the parties' separate, current addresses; and
(hi) provisions for the enforcement of these orders;
and
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may include an order
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children
and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is
reasonable and necessary.
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters
related to children born to the mother and father after entry of
the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification.
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and
visitation rights of grandparents and other members of
the immediate family, the court shall consider the best
interest of the child.
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for
peace officer enforcement, the court may include in an
order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a
provision, among other things, authorizing any peace
officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation
schedule entered under this chapter.
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parenttime provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court
shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees
expended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court
determines that the petition was without merit and not
asserted or defended against in good faith.
(7) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a
parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a
grandparent or other member of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation or parent-time
right has been previously granted by the court, the court may
award to the prevailing party costs, including actual attorney
fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered
visitation or parent-time.
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony:
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse;
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to
produce income;
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide
support;
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CHAPTER 18
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of
award with state
Punitive damages — Notification procedure
Drug exception

Basis for punitive damages awards — Section
inapplicable to DUI cases — Division of
award with state.
fk) Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive
amages may be awarded only if compensatory or general
images are awarded and it is established by clear and
gjnvincmg evidence t h a t the acts or omissions of the
>rtfeasor are the result of willful and malicious or mtenomally fraudulent conduct, or conduct t h a t manifests a
{bowing and reckless indifference toward, and a disre'ard of, the rights of others
(b) The limitations, standards of evidence, and stanlards of conduct of Subsection (l)(a) do not apply to any
iaim for punitive damages arising out of the tortfeasor s
operation of a motor vehicle or motorboat while voluntar*y intoxicated or under the influence of any drug or
combination of alcohol and drugs as prohibited by Section
416 44
(c) The award of a penalty under Section 78 11-15 or
78 11 16 regarding shoplifting is not subject to the prior
award of compensatory or general damages under Subsection (l)(a) whether or not restitution has been paid to
the merchant prior to or as a part of a civil action under
Section 78 11 15 or 78 11 16
) Evidence of a party s wealth or financial condition shall
admissible only after a finding of liability for punitive
iages has been made
*) ( a) In any case where punitive damages are awarded,
the judgment shall provide that 50% of t h e amount of the

78-18-2

punitive damages in excess of $20,000 shall after an
allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys fees and
costs be remitted by the judgment debtor to the state
treasurer for deposit into the General Fund
(b) For the purposes of this Subsection (3) an allowable deduction for the payment of attorneys fees and
costs' shall equal the amount of actual and reasonable
attorneys fees and costs incurred by the judgment credi
tor minus the amount of any separate judgment awarding
attorneys fees and costs to the judgment creditor
(c) The state shall have all rights due a judgment
creditor until the judgment is satisfied, and stand on
equal footing with the judgment creditor of the original
case in securing a recovery
(d) Unless all affected parties, including the state,
expressly agree otherwise or the application is contrary to
the terms of the judgment, any payment on the judgment
by or on behalf of any judgment debtor, whether voluntary
or by execution or otherwise, shall be applied in the
following order
(l) compensatory damages, and any applicable attorneys fees and costs,
(n) the initial $20,000 punitive damages, and finally
(m) the balance of the pumtive damages
2004
78-18-1.5. Punitive d a m a g e s — Notification procedure.
(1) Whenever it appears from a return of a jury verdict in
any court jury trial or from entry of a finding or order m any
court bench tnal, that punitive damages have been awarded to
the plaintiff in a court action, the clerk of the court shall
immediately notify the attorney general and state treasurer of
the verdict, finding, or order The notice shall contain
(a) the names of both parties to the action, and then:
attorneys,
(b) the case number, and
(c) the location of the court
(2) In addition to the notice required m Subsection (1) of
this section, the clerk of the court shall notify the attorney
general and the state treasurer within five days after entry of
a judgment award of pumtive damages The notice shall
contain
(a) the name of the party and his attorney, against
whom the judgment was ordered,
(b) the amount of the judgment, and
(c) the date on which the judgment was entered
2002
78-18-2. Drug e x c e p t i o n .
(1) Punitive damages may not be awarded if a drug causing
the claimant's harm
(a) received premarket approval or licensure by the
Federal Food and Drug Administration under the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U S C Section 301 et
seq or the Public Health Service Act, 42 U S C Section
201 et seq,
(b) is generally recognized as safe and effective under
conditions established by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration and applicable regulations, including
packaging and labeling regulations
(2) This limitation on liability for punitive damages does
not apply if it is shown by clear and convincing evidence t h a t
the drug manufacturer knowingly withheld or misrepresented
information required to be submitted to the Federal Food and
Drug Administration under its regulations, which information
was matenal and relevant to the claimant's harm
1989
CHAPTER 19
LIABILITY PROTECTION FOR VOLUNTEERS
Section
78-19 1
78-19-2
78-19-3

Definitions
Liability protection for volunteers — Exceptions
Liability protection for organizations

